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Abstract
Zeroth-order optimization is an important research topic in machine learning. In recent years,
it has become a key tool in black-box adversarial attack to neural network based image classifiers.
However, existing zeroth-order optimization algorithms rarely extract second-order information
of the model function. In this paper, we utilize the second-order information of the objective
function and propose a novel Hessian-aware zeroth-order algorithm called ZO-HessAware. Our
theoretical result shows that ZO-HessAware has an improved zeroth-order convergence rate and
query complexity under structured Hessian approximation, where we propose a few approxima-
tion methods for estimating Hessian. Our empirical studies on the black-box adversarial attack
problem validate that our algorithm can achieve improved success rates with a lower query
complexity.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the following convex optimization problem:
min
x∈Rd
f(x) (1.1)
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where f is differentiable and strongly convex. Optimization method that solves the above problem
with function value access only is known as zeroth-order optimization or black-box optimization
(Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017; Ghadimi & Lan, 2013).
Zeroth-order optimization has attracted attention from the machine learning community (Bergstra
et al., 2011; Ilyas et al., 2018) and it is especially useful for solving problem (1.1) where the evalua-
tions of gradients ∇f(x) are difficult or even infeasible. One prominent example of the zeroth-order
optimization is the black-box adversarial attack on deep neural networks (Chen et al., 2017; Hu &
Tan, 2017; Papernot et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018). In the black-box adversarial attack, only the
inputs and outputs of the neural network are available to the system and backpropagation on the
target neural network is prohibited. Another application example is the hyper-parameter tuning
which searches for the optimal parameters of deep neural networks or other learning models (Snoek
et al., 2012; Bergstra et al., 2011).
In the past years, theoretical works on zeroth-order optimization arise as alternatives of the
corresponding first-order methods, and they estimate gradients using function value difference
(Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017; Ghadimi & Lan, 2013; Duchi et al., 2015). However, these works
on zeroth-order optimization have been concentrating on extracting gradient information of the
objective function and failed to utilize the second-order Hessian information and, to some extent,
have not fully exploited the information of models and enjoyed less competitive rates. In this paper,
we aim to take advantages of the model’s second-order information and propose a novel method
called Hessian-aware zeroth-order optimization. Aligning with earlier works Nesterov & Spokoiny
(2017); Ghadimi & Lan (2013) we present in this paper our gradient estimation as follows:
gµ(x) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µH˜−1/2ui)− f(x)
µ
· H˜1/2ui, with µ > 0 (1.2)
where b is the batch size of points for gradient estimation and H˜ is an approximate Hessian at the
evaluation point. With Eqn. (1.2) at hands, the core update rule of our Hessian-aware zero-order
algorithm, namely ZO-HessAware, is
xt+1 = xt − ηH˜−1gµ(xt) = xt − ηH˜−1 · 1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µH˜−1/2ui)− f(x)
µ
· H˜1/2ui,
where η is the step size. If one lets g˜µ(x) be defined as
g˜µ(x) ,
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µu˜i)− f(x)
µ
· u˜i, with u˜i ∼ N(0, H˜−1), (1.3)
then using the linear transformation property of the multivariate Gaussian distribution, the update
rule further reduces to
xt+1 = xt − ηg˜µ(xt). (1.4)
In comparison, early zeroth-order literatures (for instance Nesterov & Spokoiny (2017)) conduct
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gradient estimation via
gˆµ(x) ,
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µui)− f(x)
µ
ui with ui ∼ N(0, Id). (1.5)
We refer (1.5) as vanilla zeroth-order optimization method. Comparing (1.3) and (1.5), one observes
that the directions of updates g˜µ and gˆµ share the same form but admit different covariances. Be-
cause g˜µ(x) contains Hessian information and shares the same form with estimated gradient gˆµ(x),
g˜µ(x) can be regarded as a natural gradient and ZO-HessAware can be regarded as natural gradient
descent method. Perhaps surprising, in the context of zeroth-order optimization the difference
between our zeroth-order update and earlier works boil down to the difference of search direction
covariances. Our special choice of covariance matrix as the approximate inversed Hessian allows us
to incorporate Hessian information into the update rule in Eqn. (1.4), which further achieves an
improved theoretical convergence rate in zeroth-order optimization.
Let the approximate Hessian H˜ satisfy ρH˜  ∇2f(x)  (2−ρ)H˜, and ζ ·Id  H˜, with 0 < ρ ≤ 1
and ζ > 0, and the algorithm be initialized at a point sufficiently close to the optimal solution. Our
main result concludes that ZO-HessAware with a proper step size achieves an iteration complexity
of N() = O
(
d
bρ log
(
1

))
, in order to obtain an -accuracy solution. If f(x) has the strong convexity
parameter τ and ρ is chosen as τ/λk+1 where λk+1 upper-bounds the Hessian’s (k + 1)-th largest
eigenvalue, then ZO-HessAware enjoys an iteration complexity (or convergence rate) of
N() = O
(
dλk+1
bτ
log
(
1

))
.
Furthermore, let ZO-HessAware be implemented with power-method based Hessian approximation
(namely ZOHA-PW) (Balcan et al., 2016), it achieves the following query complexity
Q() = O˜
(
dkλk+1
τ
log
(
1

))
.
Let L be the smoothness parameter of the objective function, vanilla zeroth-order optimization
method (Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017) shows an iteration complexity of O
(
dL
bτ log
(
1

))
and a query
complexity of O
(
dL
τ log
(
1

))
). Under a low-rank Hessian structure that kλk+1 ≤ L, our proposed
ZO-HessAware algorithm enjoys a sharper theoretical convergence rate and query complexity than
vanilla zeroth-order method (1.5).
Though ZOHA-PW obtains a nice theoretical result of query complexity, it takes at least O(d)
queries due to the power method procedure. This is very expensive especially when the dimension
d is very large. Hence, we also propose two heuristic but practical methods to construct approximate
Hessians with much lower query complexity.
(i) First, we use Gaussian sampling method to approximate Hessian. This method only samples
a small batch of points from the Gaussian distribution to estimate the Hessian with batch
size being much smaller than the data dimension d.
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(ii) Second, we propose diagonal Hessian approximation which is a popular method in training
deep neural networks. This approximation approach does not need extra query to function
value and can keep principal information of the Hessian which has been proved in training
deep neural networks (Kingma & Ba, 2015; Duchi et al., 2011; Zeiler, 2012).
To numerically justify the effectiveness of our zeroth-order algorithm ZO-HessAware, we apply it
to the task of black-box adversarial attack in the neural network based image classifier (Ilyas et al.,
2018; Chen et al., 2017). The adversarial attack aims to find an example x deviated microscopically
from the given image x0 but misclassified by the neural network classifier. We compare our algo-
rithms with two state-of-the-arts, namely PGD-NES (Ilyas et al., 2018) and ZOO (Chen et al., 2017).
The comparison shows that our two ZO-HessAware algorithm variants take reduced function value
queries while obtaining an improved success rate of attack and exhibits outstanding performance
especially when the attack task is hard. Furthermore to promote the attack success rate and reduce
the query complexity, we propose a novel strategy call Descent-Checking which empirically brings
an even higher success rate and lower query complexity.
1.1 Main Contribution
We summarize our main contribution as follows.
(i) We exploit the Hessian information of the model function and propose a novel Hessian-aware
zeroth-order algorithm called ZO-HessAware. We integrate Hessian information into gradient
estimation while keeping the algorithmic form similar to vanilla zeroth-order method. Theo-
retically we show ZO-HessAware has a faster convergence rate and lower query complexity with
power-method based Hessian approximation than existing work without Hessian information.
(ii) Several novel structured Hessian approximation methods are proposed including Gauss sam-
pling method as well as the diagonalization method. The Hessian estimation via Gauss sam-
pling only takes a few extra queries to the function value. In the construction of diagonal
approximate Hessian, we use natural gradient which contains Hessian information other than
a ordinary gradient which is used in training deep neural networks.
(iii) We propose a descent-checking trick for the black-box adversarial attack. This trick can
significantly improve the success rate and reduce the number of queries.
(iv) We empirically prove the power of Hessian information in zeroth-order optimization espe-
cially in the black-box adversarial attack. Experiment results show that our ZO-HessAware
type algorithm can achieve better success rates and need fewer queries than state-of-the-art
algorithms especially when the problem is hard.
1.2 Related Work
Zeroth-order optimization minimizes functions only through the function value oracles. It is an
important research topic in optimization (Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017; Matyas, 1965; Ghadimi &
Lan, 2013). Nesterov & Spokoiny (2017) utilized random Gaussian vectors as the search directions
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and gave the convergence properties of the zeroth-order algorithms when the objective function is
convex. Ghadimi & Lan (2013) proposed new zeroth-order algorithms which has better convergence
rate when the problem is non-smooth. Zeroth-order method with variance reduction was proposed
to solve non-convex problem recently (Fang et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018). Zeroth-order algorithm
is also a crucial research topic in the on-line learning. Lots of results were obtained in the recent
years (Shamir, 2017; Bach & Perchet, 2016; Duchi et al., 2015). In these works, one can only access
to the function value and uses this feed-back to approximate the gradient or sub-gradient.
Recently, zeroth-order algorithm is becoming the main tool for the black-box adversarial attack
(Chen et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018). Chen et al. (2017) extended the CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017)
attack which is a powerful white-box method to the black-box attack and proposed ZOO. Algorithm
ZOO can be viewed as a kind of zeroth-order stochastic coordinate descent (Chen et al., 2017). It
chooses a coordinate randomly, then uses zeroth-order oracles to estimate the gradient of current
coordinate. However, ZOO suffers from a poor query complexity because it needs O(d) queries to
estimate the gradients of all the coordinates theoretically. To reduce the query complexity, Ilyas
et al. (2018) resorted to the natural evolutionary strategies (Wierstra et al., 2014) to estimate
gradients. And Ilyas et al. (2018) used the so-called ‘antithetic sampling’ technique (Salimans
et al., 2017) to get better performance.
Furthermore, covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) is another important
zeroth-order method which is closely related to our algorithm (Hansen & Ostermeier, 2001). CMA-ES
uses a learned covariance to generate search direction and this covariance matrix is much like the
inversion of our approximate Hessian. The main difference between these two algorithms is the
way to use zeroth-order oracles. Eqn. (1.3) shows that ZO-HessAWare queries to function value to
approximate a natural gradient. In contrast, CMA-ES generates ui’s and picks up such u˜i’s as the
search directions that f(x+ u˜i) is mall.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present notation and
preliminaries. In Section 3, we depict Algorithm ZO-HessAware in detail and analyze its local and
global convergence rate, and query complexity with power-method based Hessian approximation,
respectively. In Section 4, we propose two different strategies to construct a good approximate
Hessian. In Section 5, we compare our ZO-HessAware type algorithms with two state-of-the-art
algorithms in the adversarial attack problem. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 6. All the
detailed proofs are deferred to the appendix in their order of appearance.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We first introduce notation that will be used in this paper. Then, we give some assumptions
about the objective function that will be used.
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2.1 Notation
Given a positive semi-definite matrix A ∈ Rd×d of rank-` and a positive integer k ≤ `, its
eigenvalue decomposition is given as
A = UΛUT = UkΛkU
T
k + U\kΛ\kU
T
\k, (2.1)
where Uk and U\k contain the eigenvectors of A, and Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λd) with λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥
λ` > 0 are the nonzero eigenvalues of A. We also use λmax and λmin to denote the largest and
smallest eigenvalue of a positive semi-definite matrix, respectively.
Using matrix A, we can define A-norm as ‖x‖A =
√
xTAx. Furthermore, if B is a positive
semi-definite matrix, we say B  A when A−B is positive semi-definite.
2.2 Properties of Smoothness and Convexity
In this paper, we consider functions with L-smoothness and τ -strongly convexity. It indicates
the following properties.
L-smoothness Let function f(x) be L-smooth, i.e. for all x, y ∈ Rd, we have
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ L ‖x− y‖ , (2.2)
or equivalently
|f(y)− f(x)− 〈∇f(x), y − x〉| ≤ L
2
‖x− y‖2 . (2.3)
τ-strong convexity Let function f(x) be τ -strongly convex, i.e. for all x, y ∈ Rd
f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), y − x〉+ τ
2
‖x− y‖2 .
γ-Lipschitz Hessian Let the Hessian of f(x) be γ-Lipschitz continuous, that is, for all x, y ∈ Rd∥∥∇2f(y)−∇2f(x)∥∥ ≤ γ ‖y − x‖ . (2.4)
or equivalently∣∣∣∣f(y)− f(x)− 〈∇f(x), y − x〉 − 12 〈∇2f(x)(y − x), y − x〉
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ6 ‖x− y‖3 , x, y ∈ Rd (2.5)
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2.3 Gaussian Smoothing
Let f(x) be a function which is differentiable along any direction in Rd. The Gaussian smoothing
of f(x) is defined as
fµ(x) ,
1
M
∫
Rd
f(x+ µu) exp
(
−‖u‖
2
2
)
du, where u ∼ N(0, Id), (2.6)
and
M =
∫
Rd
exp
(
−‖u‖
2
2
)
du = (2pi)d/2.
And µ is the parameter to control the smoothness. fµ(x) preserves several important properties of
f(x). For example, if f(x) is convex, then fµ(x) is also convex. If f(x) is L-smooth, then fµ(x) is
also L-smooth.
3 Hessian-Aware Zeroth-Order Method
In this section, we will exploit the Hessian information of the model function which was com-
monly ignored in the past works on zeroth-order optimization and propose ZO-HessAware algorithm.
Our algorithm first constructs an approximate Hessian H˜ for the current point x satisfies
ρH˜  ∇2f(x)  (2− ρ) · H˜, and, ζ · Id  H˜, (3.1)
with 0 < ρ ≤ 1. Parameter ρ measures how well H˜ approximates ∇2f(x). If ρ = 1, then H˜ is the
exact Hessian. One can use different methods to construct such H˜. In Section 4, we will provide
several approaches to compute a good approximate Hessian with a small number of queries to the
function value. Note that, we do not need to construct an approximate Hessian for each iteration.
Empirically, we can only update it every p iterations where p is a parameter controls the frequency
of the Hessian approximation.
Then we begin to estimate the gradient by derivative-free oracles. Different from the existing
zeroth-order works (Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017; Ghadimi & Lan, 2013; Duchi et al., 2015), the
Hessian information is used in our gradient estimation represented as follows:
gµ(x) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µKui)− f(x)
µ
K−1ui, with K = H˜−1/2, ui ∼ N(0, I) (3.2)
where b is the batch size. On the point x, we sample b + 1 points to obtain a good gradient
estimation. This strategy is widely used in real applications such as adversarial attack.
Finally, analogue to Newton-style algorithms, we update xt+1 using the approximate Hessian
and estimated gradient as xt+1 = xt − ηH˜−1gµ(x). Combining with Eqn. (3.2), we represent the
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm ZO-HessAware
1: Input: x(0) is an initial point sufficient close to x∗. And b is the batch size and p is an integer. Parameter
η is the step size.
2: for t = 0, . . . , T do
3: if t mod p == 0 then
4: Compute an approximate Hessian H˜t satisfies Eqn. (3.1).
5: end if
6: Generate b samples with ui ∼ N(0, Id) and construct g˜µ(xt) = 1b
∑b
i=1
f(x+H˜
−1/2
t ui)−f(x)
µ H˜
−1/2
t ui;
7: Update xt+1 = xt − ηg˜µ(xt).
8: end for
algorithmic procedure of ZO-HessAware as follows
g˜µ(xt) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(xt + µH˜
−1/2
t ui)− f(xt)
µ
H˜
−1/2
t ui, with ui ∼ N(0, I)
xt+1 =xt − ηg˜µ(xt).
We depict the detailed algorithmic procedure of ZO-HessAwarein Algorithm 1.
In the rest of this section, we will first give some important properties of the estimated gradient
computed as Eqn. (3.2). Then we analyze the local and global convergence property of Algorithm 1,
respectively. Finally, the query complexity will be analyzed with power-method based Hessian
approximation.
3.1 Properties of Estimated Gradient
Now, we list some important properties of gµ(x) defined in Eqn. (3.2) that will be used in our
analysis of convergence rate of ZO-HessAware in the following lemmas. These lemmas are also of
independent interest in zeroth-order algorithm.
Lemma 1. Let f(x) be L-smooth, then gµ(x) defined in Eqn. (3.2) satisfies that
‖Eu[gµ(x)]−∇f(x)‖2K2 ≤
µ2
4
L2 ‖K‖4 (d+ 3)3.
Lemma 2. Let f(x) be L-smooth, then ‖gµ(x)‖2K2 can be bounded as
Eu ‖gµ(x)‖2K2 ≤
µ2
2b
L2 ‖K‖4 (d+ 6)3 +
(
2(d+ 2)
b
+ 2
)
· ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
.
Now we give the bound of Eu
∥∥K2gµ(x)∥∥3K−2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let f(x) be L-smooth, then gµ(x) has such a property that
Eu
∥∥K2gµ(x)∥∥3K−2 ≤ 2µ3L3 ‖K‖6 · (d+ 9)9/2 + 12(d+ 5)3/2 ‖∇f(x)‖3K2 .
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3.2 Local Convergence
Now we begin to analyze the local convergence property of Algorithm 1. To achieve a fast
convergence rate, the initial point should be close enough to the optimal point. At the same time,
the Hessian should be well-approximated.
Theorem 1. Let f(x) be τ -strongly convex and L-smooth, and ∇2f(x) is γ-Lipschitz continuous.
Let the approximate Hessian H˜t satisfy Eqn. (3.1). Setting the step size η =
b
16(d+2) and b ≤ d+ 2,
then Algorithm 1 has the following convergence properties:
E [f(xt+1)− f(x?)] ≤
(
1− bρ
64(d+ 2)
)
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ,
if xt satisfies that
‖xt − x?‖ ≤ ρ
γ
·min
(
3τζ1/2
64L1/2
,
d3/2ζ2
33L(d+ 2)b2
)
, (3.3)
and ∆µ is defined as
∆µ = b ·
(
µ2L2
64ζ2
(d+ 5)2 +
µ2L2
128ζ
(d+ 38) +
γb2µ3L3
6144ζ9/2
· (d+ 110)3/2
)
.
Remark 1. Note that, the local convergence properties rely on the condition (3.3). However, this
condition may be violated for next iteration if the descent direction is not good. This problem can
be remedied by checking the value of f(xt+1). We will discard the current xt+1 if f(xt+1) is larger
than f(xt).
Let ρ be chosenO(τ/λk+1), then to achieve an -accuracy solution, by Theorem 1, our ZO-HessAware
needs
N() = O
(
d
bρ
log
(
1

))
= O
(
dλk+1
bτ
log
(
1

))
iterations. In contrast, without the second-order information, vanilla zeroth-order method needs
O
(
db−1κ log
(
1

))
iterations (Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017), where κ = L/τ is the condition number
. Since it holds that λk+1 ≤ L, ZO-HessAware has a faster convergence rate. Especially when the
Hessian can be well approximated by a rank-k matrix, that is λk+1  L, our algorithm will show
great advantages.
3.3 Global Convergence
We will analyze the global convergence property of Algorithm 1 in this section. To guarantee
a global convergence, we have to set a smaller step size compared with the one set in Theorem 1.
Then, we have the following theorem.
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Algorithm 2 Power-method Based Hessian Approximation.
1: Input: Orthonormal matrix V0 ∈ Rd×k where k is the target rank;
2: for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
3: Approximate the ∇2f(x)Vt by Yt = HµVt implemented as Eqn. (3.4);
4: QR factorization: Yt = Vt+1Rt+1, where Vt+1 consists of orthonormal columns.
5: end for
6: Compute Y = HµVT and compute the SVD decomposition Y = UˆΛVˆ
>.
7: Return: H˜ = V ΛV > + 5λk+1Id with V = VT Vˆ
Theorem 2. Let function f(x) satisfy the properties described in Theorem 1. For each iteration,
the approximate Hessian H˜t satisfies Eqn. (3.1). By choosing the step size η =
ζ
4(d+2)L , Algorithm 1
has the following convergence property
Eu [f(xt+1)− f(x?)] ≤
(
1− bζ
16(d+ 2)κL
)
· (f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ,
where ∆µ is defined as
∆µ =
bµ2L
64ζ(d+ 2)
(
2(d+ 3)3 +
(d+ 6)3
d+ 2
)
.
In our analysis of global convergence, we set a fixed step size. We can also use the line search
method to get a better convergence property at the cost of extra query to the function value.
3.4 Query Complexity Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the query complexity of ZOHA-PW which implements ZO-HessAware
with power-method based Hessian approximation. The power method only needs to access Hessian-
Vector product which can be approximated by
[∇2f(x)v]i ≈ [Hµv]i , f(x+ µ1 · (v + ei))− f(x+ µ1 · (v − ei)) + f(x− µ1 · ei)− f(x+ µ1 · ei)
2µ21
, (3.4)
where [Hµv]i means the i-th entry of vector Hµv. Note that, Hµ does not need to be explicitly
represented. And it can be regarded as the Hessian ∇2f(x) with some small perturbations.
Given the above results to approximating Hessian-vector product, we conduct power method
to obtain the k-largest eigenvalue and their corresponding eigenvectors. The detailed algorithmic
procedure is depicted in Algorithm 2. Then the approximate Hessian H˜ computed based on power
method has the following properties.
Theorem 3. Let the objective function satisfy Eqn. (2.4). Let µ1 and the iteration number T
satisfy that
µ1 ≤ min
{
C1
4kγ
λk+1,
C2
4
cos(Uk, V0)
}
and T = 2C3 log (2 tan(Uk, V0))
where Uk is the matrix consists of eigenvectors corresponding to the first k largest eigenvalues of
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∇2f(x). C1, C2, and C3 are absolute constants. Then H˜ returned from Algorithm 2 has the
following property
λmin
λmin + 10λk+1
H˜  ∇2f(x)  H˜, and, 5λk+1Id  H˜.
The definition of the angle between two spaces Uk and V0 can be found in the textbook (?). The-
orem 3 provides a specific choice of ρ = λminλmin+10λk+1 in Eqn. (3.1). Combining the convergence rate
in Theorem 1, we give the query complexity analysis of ZOHA-PW which implements ZO-HessAware
with power-method based Hessian approximation (Balcan et al., 2016).
Theorem 4. Set the b = O(d) and p = 1 in Algorithm 1. Then the query complexity of ZOHA-PW
is
Q() = O˜
(
dkλk+1
τ
· log
(
1

))
.
The approximate Hessian H˜ constructed using power method can capture the dominant rank-k
information of ∇2f(x). We have the empirical fact that the Hessian of model function can be
represented as a rank-k matrix containing the dominant information, plus a perturbation matrix
of small spectral norm (Yuan et al., 2007; Bakker et al., 2018; Sainath et al., 2013). In the case
that k · λk+1 < L, the query complexity of ZOHA-PW is smaller than vanilla zeroth-order methods
without Hessian information which takes O
(
dL
τ · log
(
1

))
queries shown in the work of Nesterov &
Spokoiny (2017). If the Hessian update frequency p > 1, then the query complexity of ZOHA-PW
can further be reduced.
Furthermore, we can use VT of the last iteration of Algorithm 1 as the input V0 of Algorithm 2.
Because xt is close to the optimal point x
?, the value of tan(Uk, V0) can be regarded as a constant,
that is, we can obtain an approximate Hessian in O(dk) query complexity. Hence, the query
complexity of ZOHA-PW can be further improved to O
(
dkλk+1
τ · log
(
1

))
.
4 Structured Hessian Approximation
In this section, we will provide two kinds of heuristic methods to construct approximate Hessian.
These methods takes much fewer queries to function value compared with power-method based
Hessian approximation which takes at least O(dk) queries. The first method is based on Gauss
sampling and the second one is based on diagonalization.
4.1 Gaussian-Sampling Based Hessian Approximation
We propose a novel method to approximate the Hessian of f(x) with a much lower query
complexity than power method. It is based on Gaussian Sampling, and we name ZO-HessAware
implemented with such Hessian approximation as ZOHA-Gauss.
Our new method is going to estimate the Hessian of fµ(x) defined in Eqn. (2.6). Since ∇2fµ(x)
is close to ∇2f(x) if µ is small, a good approximation of ∇2fµ(x) will also approximate ∇2f(x)
well. In fact, we can bound the error between ∇2f(x) and ∇2fµ(x) as follows.
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Lemma 4. Let fµ(x) be defined in Eqn. (2.6). The objective function f(x) satisfies Eqn. (2.4).
Then, we have ∥∥∇2fµ(x)−∇2f(x)∥∥ ≤ γµ(d+ 1)1/2.
Using Gaussian sampling, we can approximate the Hessian of fµ(x) as follows:
H˜ = b−1
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µui) + f(x− µui)− 2f(x)
2µ2
uiu
>
i + λId, with ui ∼ N(0, Id) (4.1)
where λ is a properly chosen regularizer to keep H˜ invertible. In the construction of H˜ of Eqn. (4.1),
we only take a small batch of points, that is b is small even much smaller the dimension d. Hence,
the construction of such H˜ has a low query complexity.
The approximate Hessian H˜ constructed as Eqn. (4.1) has the following property.
Lemma 5. Let H˜ be an approximate Hessian defined in Eqn. (4.1). Function fµ(x) is the smoothed
function defined in Eqn. (2.6). Then H˜ has the following property
∇2fµ(x)  Eu[H˜] = ∇2fµ(x) +
(
λ− f(x)− fµ(x)
µ2
)
· Id
Combining Lemma 4 and 5, we can obtain the result that if µ is small, and the batch size b in
Eqn. 4.1 is large, then H˜ constructed as Eqn. (4.1) can approximate ∇2f(x) well. In practice, we
prefer to choosing a small batch size b to achieve query efficiency.
4.2 Diagonalization Based Hessian Approximation
We propose to use a diagonal matrix to approximate the Hessian. This method has been used
in the optimization of deep neural networks (Kingma & Ba, 2015; Zeiler, 2012; Tieleman & Hinton,
2012) and online learning (Duchi et al., 2011).
First, we compute an approximate Hessian in the manner of ADAM (Kingma & Ba, 2015) as
follows:
g˜µ(xt−1) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(xt−1 + µu˜i)− f(xt−1)
µ
u˜i, with u˜i ∼ N(0, H˜−1t−1)
Dt =νDt−1 + (1− ν)g˜2µ(xt−1)
H˜t =diag
(
Dt
1− νt
) (4.2)
with 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. And g˜2µ(x) means the entry-wise square of g˜µ(x).
Second, we can also use the method of ADAGRAD (Duchi et al., 2011) to construct the approximate
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Hessian as
g˜µ(xt−1) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(xt−1 + µu˜i)− f(xt−1)
µ
u˜i, with u˜i ∼ N(0, H˜−1t−1)
Dt =Dt−1 + g˜2µ(xt−1)
H˜t =diag
(
Dt
n
)
.
Other methods of constructing diagonal Hessian approximation such as ADADELTA (Zeiler, 2012)
used in training deep neural networks can also be use to in our diagonal Hessian approximation.
These kinds of Hessian approximation are heuristic. We can not give an exact convergence rate
of ZO-HessAware with diagonal Hessian approximation by Theorem 1. However, diagonal Hessian
approximations have shown their power in training deep neural networks. Furthermore, diagonal
approximate Hessian has an important advantage that it does not need extra queries to the function
value and need less computational and storage cost.
Though the construction procedure of the diagonal Hessian approximation is the same with the
one of ADAM and ADAGRAD, there some difference between these diagonal Hessians. First, ADAM and
ADAGRAD use H˜1/2 as the approximate Hessian in training neural network which is different from
our approximate Hessian. Second, in the construction of our diagonal Hessian, we use the ‘natural
gradient’ defined in Eqn. (1.3) which contains the Hessian information other than the ordinary
gradient. And the information of the current diagonal Hessian will be used in the estimation
of next ‘natural gradient’. In contrast, the diagonal Hessian will not affect the computation of
gradients.
5 Experiments
In this section, we apply our Hessian-aware zeroth-order algorithm to the black-box adversarial
attacks. This is an important research topic in security of deep learning because neural networks are
widely used in image classification. However, current neural network-based classifiers are susceptible
to adversarial examples.
Our adversarial attack experiments include both targeted attack and un-targeted attack. The
targeted attack aims to find an adversarial example x of a given image x0 with a targeted class label
` toward misclassification. In this case, we are going to minimize the following problem proposed
in the work of Carlini & Wagner (2017):
f(x, `) = max
{
max
i6=`
log[Z(x)]i − log[Z(x)]`,−ω
}
, (5.1)
with constraint that
‖x− x0‖∞ ≤ ε. (5.2)
Z(x) is the logit layer representation after softmax in the DNN for x such that [Z(x)]i represents
the predicted probability that x belongs to class i. ω is a tuning parameter for attack transferability
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and we set ω = 1 in our experiments. The constraint means that the adversarial image should be
close to the given image.
The un-targeted adversarial attack aims to find an example x of the given image x0 with label
` but misclassified by the neural network. In this case, we will minimize the following function
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017) with constraint (5.2):
f(x) = max
{
log[Z(x)]` −max
i 6=`
log[Z(x)]i,−ω
}
. (5.3)
5.1 Algorithm Implementation
In the experiments, we will implement ZO-HessAware (Algorithm 1) with two different kinds of
Hessian approximation. The first one is based on the Gaussian sampling described in Section 4.1,
and we call it ZOHA-Gauss. The second implementation is using the diagonal Hessian approxi-
mation described in Section 4.2 with the update procedure as ADAM defined in Eqn. (4.2). And we
name it as ZOHA-Diag. We do not implement ZO-HessAware with other kinds of diagonal Hessian
approximation because these methods have the similar performance.
Furthermore, because the adversarial problem is of constraint, we will modify the update step (7)
of Algorithm 1 as follows:
xt+1 = Π[xt − ηg˜µ(xt)], (5.4)
where Π[·] is a projection operator to make xt+1 satisfy ‖xt+1 − x0‖∞ ≤ ε. Note that, this projection
is exact for ZOHA-Diag. But as to ZOHA-Gauss, we should compute xt+1 by optimizing the following
sub-problem:
xt+1 = argmin
y∈[x0−,x0+]
∥∥∥y − (xt − ηH˜−1t gµ(xt))∥∥∥2
H˜
. (5.5)
However, the projection as Eqn. (5.4) performs well and is of simple implementation even it is just
an approximation to the true one computed by Eqn. (5.5).
Because the objective function of the neural network model may be non-convex, we implement
the approximate Hessian in ZOHA-Gauss as follows:
H˜ = b−1
b∑
i=1
|f(x+ µui) + f(x− µui)− 2f(x)|
2µ2
uiu
>
i + λId, with ui ∼ N(0, Id).
Such modification ensures that such H˜ is positive definite. Furthermore, we observe that H˜ can
be written as H˜ = CC> + λI. Then we can compute H˜−1/2 as follows. First, we compute
the SVD decomposition of C as C = UCΛCU
>
C with UC ∈ Rd×b and ΛC ∈ Rb×b. And we get
H˜−1/2 = UC
(
(Λ2C + λI)
−1/2 − λ−1/2I)U>C + λ−1/2I. In practice, the value of λ can be set as a
fraction of
∥∥CC>∥∥ or tuned by several tries.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm ZO-HessAware with descent checking (ZOHA-DC)
1: Input: x(0) is an initial point sufficient close to x∗. And b is the batch size and p is an integer. Parameter
η is the step size. β is the threshold of sample size in descent checking. δb is the parameter of the sample
size increment.
2: for t = 0, . . . , T do
3: if t mod p == 0 then
4: Compute an approximate Hessian H˜t satisfies Eqn. (3.1).
5: end if
6: Generate b samples with ui ∼ N(0, Id) and construct g˜µ(xt) = 1b
∑b
i=1
f(x+H˜
−1/2
t ui)−f(x)
µ H˜
−1/2
t ui;
7: Compute yt+1 = xt − ηg˜µ(xt) and set Nb = b.
8: while f(yt+1) > f(xt) and Nb < β do
9: Generate another δb samples with ui ∼ N(0, Id) and set Nb = Nb + δb;
10: Construct g˜µ(xt) =
1
Nb
∑Nb
i=1
f(x+H˜
−1/2
t ui)−f(x)
µ H˜
−1/2
t ui ;
11: Compute yt+1 = xt − ηg˜µ(xt).
12: end while
13: Update xt+1 = xt − ηg˜µ(xt).
14: end for
5.1.1 Descent Checking
To improve the success rate and the query efficiency, we introduce an important technique called
Descent-Checking which has been discussed in Remark 1 but with a slight different implemen-
tation. Descent-Checking has the following algorithmic procedure. After obtaining the xt+1, we
will query to the value f(xt+1) and check if f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt). If it holds, we will go to the next iter-
ation. Otherwise, we will discard current xt+1 and take extra δb samples combining with existing
samples to estimate a new gradient until a new xt+1 satisfies f(xt+1) ≤ f(xt) or the total sample
size exceeds a threshold. If the total sample size exceeds the threshold, we will accept this ‘bad’
xt+1 and go to the next iteration. Because we will often set b be of several tens, Descent-Checking
strategy will not bring many extra queries. As a result of Descent-Checking, we can filter some
bad search direction effectively which will lead to a higher attack success rate. We depict the
detailed algorithmic procedure of ZO-HessAware with Descent-Checking in Algorithm 3. Accord-
ingly, we name ZOHA-Gauss and ZOHA-Diag with Descent-Checking strategy as ZOHA-Gauss-DC
and ZOHA-Diag-DC, respectively.
5.2 Evalution on MNIST
We evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks against an convolution neural network (CNN) on
the MNIST dataset. The network for MNIST is composed of two 5×5 convolutional layers with
output 16 and 64 channels following two fully connected layers with 128 and 10 units. We use 2×2
max-pooling after each convolutional layer and use ReLU after every layer expect the layer. The
network is trained for 100 epochs with learning rate starting at 0.1 and decay 0.5 every 20 epochs.
The accuracy of the model is 98.95%.
We test the attack algorithms on 10000 images from the test set. The limit of `∞ perturbation
is ε = 0.2. We run all the attack until getting the an adversarial examples unless the number of
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Figure 1: The distribution of the number of queries on targeted black-box attacks on CNN model
and MNIST
queries is more than 50, 000. The parameter settings of algorithms is listed in Table 3 in Appendix.
Furthermore, in ZOHA-Gauss and ZOHA-Gauss-DC, we update approximate Hessian once every p =
20 iterations and µ = 0.5 in Eqn. (4.1). To make a fair comparison, we do not add ‘momentum’
which is an effective technique to reduce queries to all algorithms including ZOHA-type algorithms,
PGD-NES, and ZOO.
We report the experiment results in Table 1 and Figure 1 and 2. The visualization of adversarial
attack is present in Appendix F. We can observe that ZO-HessAware with different implementations
obtain much better success rates than two state-of-the-art algorithms. This validates the effective-
ness of second-order information of model function in zeroth-order optimization. Especially, our
ZOHA-DC type algorithms obtain the best success rates both target and un-target adversarial at-
tacks which are much higher than ZOO and PGD-NES while taking less queries to function values.
Furthermore, on the un-target attack, ZOHA-DC type algorithms only take less than half of queries
of PGD-NES. This greatly shows the query efficiency of our Hessian-aware zeroth-order algorithm.
The comparison of the distribution of the query number in Figure 1 and 2 shows that Descent
Checking technique can reduce the query number effectively. For example, comparing ZOHA-Gauss
with ZOHA-Gauss-DC in Figure 2, we can observe that the percentage of the query number between
0 and 2000 of ZOHA-Gauss-DC is much higher than the one of ZOHA-Gauss.
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Figure 2: The distribution of the number of queries on un-targeted black-box attacks on CNN
model and MNIST
5.3 Evaluation on ImageNet
In this experiment, we use a pre-trained ResNet50 that has 78.15% top-1 accuracy and 92.87%
top-5 accuracy for evaluation. The limit of `∞ perturbation is ε = 0.05. We will choose 1, 000
images randomly from ImageNet test-set for evaluation and run the attack method until getting an
adversarial example or the number of queries being more than 1, 000, 000. Furthermore, if the attack
is targeted, the target label will be randomly chosen from 1, 000 classes. The parameter settings
of algorithms is listed in Table 4 in Appendix. Furthermore, in ZOHA-Gauss and ZOHA-Gauss-DC,
we update approximate Hessian once every p = 20 iterations and µ = 0.5 in Eqn. (4.1). To make
a fair comparison, we do not add ‘momentum’ which is an effective technique to reduce queries to
all algorithms including ZOHA-type algorithms, PGD-NES, and ZOO.
In the experiment on ImageNet, instead of Eqn. (3.2), we use the following method to estimate
the gradient
gµ(x) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µH˜−1/2ui)− f(x− µH˜−1/2ui)
2µ
H˜1/2ui.
We can see that such gµ have the same expectation with the one defined in Eqn. (3.2). However,
it has a better performance in this experiment. Accordingly, the natural gradient g˜µ(x) is modified
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Table 1: Comparison of `∞ norm based black-box attacks on CNN model and MNIST with ε = 0.2
Algorithm success rate % median queries average queries
targeted
ZOO (Chen et al., 2017) 42.13 15,200 17,091
PGD-NES (Ilyas et al., 2018) 44.19 7,300 10,496
ZOHA-Gauss 50.03 3,712 6,649
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 56.14 2,941 6,246
ZOHA-Diag 52.13 6,400 9,128
ZOHA-Diag-DC 55.56 3,936 7,239
un-targeted
ZOO (Chen et al., 2017) 77.18 13,300 16,390
PGD-NES (Ilyas et al., 2018) 81.55 5,800 8,567
ZOHA-Gauss 85.06 3,612 5,000
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 88.80 2,152 3,629
ZOHA-Diag 90.37 4,500 6,439
ZOHA-Diag-DC 91.90 2,460 4,352
similarly as
g˜µ(x) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
f(x+ µu˜i)− f(x− µu˜i)
2µ
u˜i, with u˜i ∼ N(0, H˜−1).
We report the results in Table 2 and Figure 3, 4. The visualization of adversarial attack is
present in Figure 6 and 7 of Appendix F. We can observe that our algorithms take much less
queries than ZOO and PGD-NES. For the un-target attack, the median queries of ZOHA-Diag-DC is
only about 5% of ZOO and about 38% of PGD-NES with the same success rate. For the target attack,
compared with the un-target attack problem, all these algorithms take much more queries. But
our algorithms still show great query efficiency. Especially, both ZOHA-Diag and ZOHA-Diag-DC
achieve 100% attack success rate which is higher than PGD-NES but only with about 50% queries of
PGD-NES. Though ZOO also obtain a 100% success rate, it takes several times of queries as ZOHA-Diag
and ZOHA-Diag-DC.
5.4 Discussion
From above two experiments, we can find some important insights. First, the comparison
between attack success rates of two deep learning models indicates that a deeper or more complicate
neural network potentially involves more vulnerability to the adversarial attack. On the ResNet50,
all algorithms achieve success rates over 99%. In contrast, the attack success rate on the simple
convolution network with several layers is much lower.
Second, the great gap of success rates between our Hessian-aware zeroth-order methods and two
state-of-the-art algorithms on the MNIST may reveal such a potential that the Hessian information
will bring great advantages on the hard adversarial attack problem.
Third, we can observe that our algorithms with Descent-Checking have better performance
than the ones without Descent-Checking. The experiment results on the MNIST show that
19
Table 2: Comparison of `∞ norm based black-box attacks on ResNet50 model and ImageNet with
ε = 0.05
Algorithm success rate % median queries average queries
targeted
ZOO (Chen et al., 2017) 100 39,100 45,822
PGD-NES (Ilyas et al., 2018) 99.37 11,270 17,435
ZOHA-Gauss 99.62 8,748 12,257
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 100 8,588 11,770
ZOHA-Diag 100 7,400 9,123
ZOHA-Diag-DC 100 6,273 8,574
un-targeted
ZOO (Chen et al., 2017) 100 12,700 14,199
PGD-NES (Ilyas et al., 2018) 100 1,500 2,283
ZOHA-Gauss 100 1,212 2,259
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 100 1,124 1,959
ZOHA-Diag 100 800 1,149
ZOHA-Diag-DC 100 561 945
Descent-Checking strategy can promote attack success rate effectively both for targeted and un-
targeted attack. At the same time, Descent-Checking is an effective way to reduce query com-
plexity. This can be easily observed from the distribution of the number of queries in Figure 1-4.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel zeroth-order algorithmic framework called ZO-HessAware which
exploits the second-order Hessian information of the model function. ZO-HessAware achieves a
faster convergence rate and lower query complexity than vanilla zeroth-order algorithms that does
not use the second-order information. Simultaneously, we propose several novel query-efficient
approaches to capture the dominant information of the Hessian. Experiments on the black-box
adversarial attack show that our ZO-HessAware algorithms improve the attack success rate and
reduce the query complexity effectively. This validates the effectiveness of the Hessian information
in zeroth-order optimization and our theoretical analysis empirically. We also propose a technique
called Descent-Checking which can empirically further promote attack success rate and reduce
query complexity.
20
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Number of Queries
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
(a) ZOO
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Number of Queries
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
(b) ZOHA-Gauss
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Number of Queries
0
50
100
150
200
250
(c) ZOHA-Diag
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Number of Queries
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
(d) PGD-NES
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Number of Queries
0
50
100
150
200
(e) ZOHA-Gauss-DC
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Number of Queries
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
(f) ZOHA-Diag-DC
Figure 3: The distribution of the number of queries on targeted black-box attacks on ResNet50
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A Proof of Section 3.1
In this section, we will prove three properties of the estimated gradient defined in Eqn. (3.2).
Before that, we first list some important lemmas related to the Gaussian distribution that will be
used in our proof.
A.1 Important Lemmas
Lemma 6 ((Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017)). If f(x) is L-smooth, then we have
‖∇fµ(y)−∇fµ(x)‖ ≤ L ‖x− y‖ .
Lemma 7 ((Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017)). If f(x) is L-smooth, then
‖∇fµ(x)−∇f(x)‖ ≤ µ
2
L(d+ 3)3/2.
If the Hessian is γ-Lipschitz continuous, then we can guarantee that
∥∥∇2fµ(x)−∇2f(x)∥∥ ≤ µ2
6
γ(d+ 4)2.
Lemma 8 ((Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017)). Let p ≥ 2, u be from N(0, Id), then we have the following
bound
dp/2 ≤ Eu [‖u‖p] ≤ (p+ d)p/2.
Then we give the results of moments of products quadratic forms in normal distribution.
Lemma 9 ((Magnus, 1978)). Let A and B be two symmetric matrices, and u has the Gaussian
distribution, that is, u ∼ N(0, Id). Define z = u>Au · u>Bu. The expectation of z and z2 are:
Eu(z) =(tr A)(tr B) + 2(tr AB)
Eu(z2) =(tr A)2(tr B)2 + 16
[
(tr A)(tr AB2) + (tr B)(tr A2B)
]
+ 2
[
(tr A)2(tr B)2 + 4(tr A)(tr B)(tr AB) + (tr B)2(tr A2)
]
+ 4
[
(tr A2)(tr B2) + 2(tr AB)2
]
+ 16
[
(tr AB)2 + 2(tr A2B2)
]
.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. First, the gradient of fµ(x) can be represented as (Nesterov & Spokoiny, 2017):
∇fµ(x) = 1
M
∫
Rd
f(x+ µu)− f(x)
µ
u exp
(
−‖u‖
2
2
)
du
=Eu
[
f(x+ µu)− f(x)
µ
u
]
(A.1)
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Let us denote
h(y) , f(x+Ky).
Then we have
f(x) = h(0).
By Eqn. (A.1), we have
Eu
f(x+ µKu)− f(x)
µ
u = Eu
h(0 + µu)− h(0)
µ
u = ∇hµ(0).
And we also have
∇h(0) = K · ∇f(x)
By Lemma 7, we can obtain that
‖∇hµ(0)−∇h(0)‖ ≤ µ
2
L(hµ)(d+ 3)
3/2. (A.2)
where L(hµ) is the smoothness parameter of hµ(y). By Lemma 6, we know that L(hµ) is no larger
than the one of h(y). And L(h) has the following upper bound:
L(h) ≤ L(f) ‖K‖2 = L ‖K‖2 .
Therefore, we have
‖Eu[gµ(x)]−∇f(x)‖2K2 =
∥∥K−1(∇hµ(0)−∇h(0))∥∥2K2
= ‖∇hµ(0)−∇h(0)‖2
≤µ
2
4
L2 ‖K‖4 (d+ 3)3.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. By the definition of gµ(x), we have
Eu ‖gµ(x)‖2K2 =
1
µ2b2
E
∥∥∥∥∥
(
b∑
i=1
[f(x+ µKui)− f(x)]K−1ui
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
K2
=
1
µ2b2
Eui,uj
∑
i,j
(f(x+ µKui)− f(x)) (f(x+ µKui)− f(x))uiuj
=
1
µ2b
Eu
(
[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)]2 ∥∥K−1u∥∥2
K2
)
+
1
µ2b2
∑
i 6=j
(Eui (f(x+ µKui)− f(x))ui)
(
Euj (f(x+ µKuj)− f(x))uj
)
=
1
µ2b
Eu
(
[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)]2 ∥∥K−1u∥∥2
K2
)
+
b2 − b
b2
‖E[gµ(x)]‖2K2
≤ 1
µ2b
Eu
(
[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)]2 ∥∥K−1u∥∥2
K2
)
+ 2 ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
The first equality is because ui’s are independent, and we have
[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)]2 =[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)− µ 〈∇f(x),Ku〉+ µ 〈∇f(x),Ku〉]
≤2
[
µ2
2
L ‖K‖2 ‖u‖2
]2
+ 2µ2〈∇f(x),Ku〉2
where the last inequality is from Lemma 1. We can also obtain that
Eu
[
〈K∇f(x), u〉2 ∥∥K−1u∥∥2
K2
]
=Eu
[
u>K∇f(x)∇f(x)>K>u · u>K−1K2K−1u
]
=(trK∇f(x)∇f(x)>K>)(tr I) + 2tr(K∇f(x)∇f(x)>K>)
=d ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 + 2 ‖∇f(x)‖2K2
=(d+ 2) ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 ,
where the second equation is because of Lemma 9 with A = K∇f(x)∇f(x)>K> and B =
K−1K2K−1 = I. Therefore, we have
Eu ‖gµ(x)‖2K2
≤µ
2
2b
L2 ‖K‖4 Eu
[
‖u‖4 · ∥∥K−1u∥∥2
K2
]
+
1
b
· Eu
[
〈K∇f(x), u〉2 ∥∥K−1u∥∥2
K2
]
+ 2 ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
≤µ
2
2b
L2 ‖K‖4 Eu
[
‖u‖6
]
+
(
2(d+ 2)
b
+ 2
)
· ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
≤µ
2
2b
L2 ‖K‖4 (d+ 6)3 +
(
2(d+ 2)
b
+ 2
)
· ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
, (A.3)
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 8.
26
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. First, we have
Eu
∥∥K2gµ(x)∥∥3K−2 ≤ 1µ3b3 · b2
b∑
i=1
Eui
(
[f(x+ µKui)− f(x)]3 · ‖Kui‖3K−2
)
=
1
µ3
Eu
(
[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)]3 · ‖u‖3
)
.
Furthermore, we can obtain that
[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)]3 =[f(x+ µKu)− f(x)− µ 〈∇f(x),Ku〉+ µ 〈∇f(x),Ku〉]3
≤4
[
µ2
2
L ‖K‖2 ‖u‖2
]3
+ 4µ3〈K∇f(x), u〉3,
and we also have
Eu
[
‖u‖3 · 〈K∇f(x), u〉3
]
=Eu
[(
(u>u)2 · (u>K∇f(x)∇>f(x)Ku)2
)3/4]
≤
(
Eu
[
(u>u)2 · (u>K∇f(x)∇>f(x)Ku)2
])3/4
,
where the last inequality is because Jensen’s inequality.
Let us denote A = K∇f(x)∇>f(x)K. It is easy to check that A is a rank one positive
semi-definite matrix, and its trace satisfies that tr(A) = ‖∇f(x)‖2K2 . By Lemma 9 with A =
K∇f(x)∇>f(x)K and B = I, we have
Eu
[
(u>u)2 · (u>K∇f(x)∇>f(x)Ku)2
]
=(tr Id)
2(tr A)2 + 16[(tr Id)(tr IdA
2) + (tr A)(tr I2dA)]
+ 4[(tr I2d)(tr A
2) + 2(tr IdA)
2] + 2[(tr Id)
2(tr A2) + 4(trId)(tr A)(tr IdA)
+ (tr A)2(trI2d)] + 16[tr(IdA)
2 + 2(tr I2dA
2)]
=d2 ‖∇f(x)‖4K2 + 16
[
d ‖∇f(x)‖4K2 + ‖∇f(x)‖4K2
]
+ 4
[
d ‖∇f(x)‖4K2 + 2 ‖∇f(x)‖4K2
]
+ 2
[
d2 ‖∇f(x)‖4K2 + 4d ‖∇f(x)‖4K2 + d ‖∇f(x)‖4k2
]
+ 16
[
‖∇f(x)‖4K2 + 2 ‖∇f(x)‖4K2
]
=(3d2 + 30d+ 72) · ‖∇f(x)‖4K2 .
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Thus, we can obtain that
Eu
[
‖u‖3 · 〈K∇f(x), u〉3
]
≤
(
Eu
[
(u>u)2 · (u>K∇f(x)∇>f(x)Ku)2
])3/4
≤
(
(3d2 + 30d+ 72) · ‖∇f(x)‖4K2
)3/4
≤
(
3(d+ 5)2 · ‖∇f(x)‖4K2
)3/4
≤3(d+ 5)3/2 ‖∇f(x)‖3K2 .
Therefore, we have
Eu
∥∥K2gµ(x)∥∥3K−2 ≤ 1µ3Eu
(
4
[
µ2
2
L ‖K‖2 ‖u‖2
]3
‖u‖3 + 4µ3〈K∇f(x), u〉3 ‖u‖3
)
≤µ
3L3 ‖K‖6
2
Eu
[
‖u‖9
]
+ 12(d+ 5)3/2 ‖∇f(x)‖3K2
≤2µ3L3 ‖K‖6 · (d+ 9)9/2 + 12(d+ 5)3/2 ‖∇f(x)‖3K2 .
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 8.
B Proof of Convergence Rate of Algorithm 1
In this section, we will prove the convergence rate of Algorithm 1. Before that, we first give an
important lemma which depicts some properties related to the strong convexity.
Lemma 10. Let f be continuously differentiable and strongly convex with parameter τ . And x? is
the minimizer of f . Then for any x ∈ Rd, we have
‖∇f(x)‖2 ≥ 2τ(f(x)− f(x?),
and
‖x− x?‖2 ≤ 2
τ
(f(x)− f(x?)).
Proof. First, by the strong convexity of f ,
f(x?) ≥f(x) + 〈∇f(x), x? − x〉+ τ
2
‖x? − x‖2
≥f(x) + min
v
(
〈∇f(x), v〉+ τ
2
‖v‖2
)
=f(x)− 1
2τ
‖∇f(x)‖2 .
The last equality holds by plugging in the minimizer v = −∇f(x)/τ .
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Also by the strong convexity of f , we have
f(x) ≥f(x?) + 〈∇f(x?), x− x?〉+ τ
2
‖x? − x‖2
=f(x?) +
τ
2
‖x? − x‖2 .
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Now, we give the proof of the local convergence properties depicted in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let H denote the Hessian ∇2f(xt). Taking a random step from xt, we have
Eu [f(xt+1)]
=Eu
[
f(xt − ηH˜−1gµ(xt))
]
(2.5)
≤ f(xt)− η
〈
∇f(xt), H˜−1Eu[gµ(xt)]
〉
+
η2
2
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥2
H
+
η3γ
6
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥3
(3.1)
≤ f(xt)− η ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 − η
〈
∇f(xt), H˜−1 (Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt))
〉
+ η2Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥2
H˜
+
η3γ
6
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥3
≤f(xt)− η ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
η
2
(
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 + ‖Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1
)
(B.1)
+ η2Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥2
H˜
+
η3γ
6
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥3
=f(xt)− η
2
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
η
2
‖Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+ η2Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥2
H˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
η3γ
6
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥3︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
,
where inequality (B.1) follows from Cauchy’s Inequality.
Now we begin to bound terms T1, T2, and T3. First, by Lemma 1 with K = H˜
−1/2, we have
‖Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 = ‖Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt)‖2K2 ≤
µ2L2
4
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 3)3,
that is,
T1 ≤ ηµ
2L2
8
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 3)3.
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By Lemma 2 with K = H˜−1/2, we have
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥2
H˜
=Eu ‖gµ(xt)‖2H˜−1
≤µ
2
2b
L2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 6)3 + (2(d+ 2)
b
+ 2
)
‖∇f(x)‖2
H˜−1 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
.
Using the condition that b ≤ d+ 2, T2 is upper bounded as
T2 ≤ η2
(
µ2L2
2b
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 6)3 + 4(d+ 2)
b
‖∇f(x)‖2
H˜−1 +
µ2L2(d+ 3)3
2
)
.
Using Lemma 3, we have
T3 =
η3
6
· Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥3
≤η
3
6
·
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · Eu ∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥3
H˜
≤
γµ3L3η3
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥9/2
12
· (d+ 9)9/2 + 2γη3(d+ 5)3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1 .
Thus, we have
T1 + T2 + T3
≤ηµ
2L2
8
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 3)3 + µ2L2η2
2b
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 6)3 + 4(d+ 2)η2
b
‖∇f(x)‖2
H˜−1
+
η2µ2L2
2
(d+ 3)3 +
γµ3L3η3
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥9/2
12
· (d+ 9)9/2 + 2γη3(d+ 5)3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1 .
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By choosing η = b16(d+2) , we obtain that
Eu [f(xt+1)]
≤f(xt)− η
2
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 + T1 + T2 + T3
≤f(xt)− b
64(d+ 2)
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
µ2L2b
64
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 5)2 + bµ2L2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
128
(d+ 38)
+
b3γµ3L3
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥9/2
6144
· (d+ 110)3/2 + b
2µ2L2
256
(d+ 7) +
b3γ
64
d−3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1
=f(xt)− b
32(d+ 2)
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
b3γ
64
d−3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1
+ b ·
µ2L2
64
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 5)2 + µ2L2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
128
(d+ 38) +
µ2L2b
256
(d+ 7) +
γb2µ3L3
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥9/2
6144
· (d+ 110)3/2

=f(xt)− b
32(d+ 2)
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
b3γ
64
d−3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1 + ∆µ,
where we denote
∆µ = b·
µ2L2
64
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 5)2 + µ2L2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
128
(d+ 38) +
µ2L2b
256
(d+ 7) +
γb2µ3L3
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥9/2
6144
· (d+ 110)3/2
 .
Now, we begin to give the connections between ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 and f(xt) − f(x?). First, by the
Taylor’s expansion, we have
∇f(xt) =∇f(x?) +∇2f(x?)(xt − x?) +
∫ 1
0
(∇2f(x? + s(xt − x?))−∇2f(x?)) (xt − x?)ds
=∇2f(x?)(xt − x?) + ∆1.
where the last equation is because ∇f(x?) = 0 and we denote that
∆1 ,
∫ 1
0
(∇2f(x? + s(xt − x?))−∇2f(x?)) (xt − x?)ds,
and ‖∆1‖ is upper bounded as
‖∆1‖ ≤ ρ
∫ 1
0
s ‖xt − x?‖2 ds = ρ
2
‖xt − x?‖2 . (B.2)
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Let us denote H? = ∇2f(x?). We have
− ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1
=− ‖H?(xt − x?) + ∆1‖2H˜−1
=− ‖H(xt − x?) + ∆1 + (H? −H)(xt − x?)‖2H˜−1
≤−
(
‖H(xt − x?)‖2H˜−1 + ‖∆1‖2H˜−1 + ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖2H˜−1
)
+ 2
(
‖H(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 · ‖∆1‖H˜−1 + ‖∆1‖H˜−1 · ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖H˜−1
+ ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 · ‖H(xt − x?)‖H˜−1
)
≤− ρ ‖xt − x?‖2H + ∆2.
where the last inequality is because of the condition that ρH˜  H and we denote that
∆2 =2 ‖H(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 · ‖∆1‖H˜−1 + 2 ‖∆1‖H˜−1 · ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖H˜−1
+ 2 ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 · ‖H(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 .
Furthermore, we have
f(xt)
(2.5)
≤ f(x?) + 〈∇f(x?), xt − x?〉+ 1
2
〈∇2f(x?)(xt − x?), xt − x?〉+ γ
6
‖xt − x?‖3
=f(x?) +
1
2
‖xt − x?‖2H? +
γ
6
‖xt − x?‖3 .
Hence, we have
−1
2
‖xt − x?‖2H? ≤ − (f(xt)− f(x?)) +
γ
6
‖xt − x?‖3 (B.3)
Therefore, we obtain that
− ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1
≤− ρ ‖xt − x?‖2H + ∆2
≤− ρ
(
‖xt − x?‖2H? + 〈xt − x?, (H −H?)(xt − x?)〉
)
+ ∆2
(B.3)
≤ − 2ρ
(
f(xt)− f(x?)− γ
6
‖xt − x?‖3 − 1
2
〈xt − x?, (H −H?)(xt − x?)〉
)
+ ∆2
(2.4)
≤ − 2ρ(f(xt)− f(x?)) + 4γρ
3
‖xt − x?‖3 + ∆2.
Now we begin to bound the value of ∆2. First, by the condition ∇2f(x) ≤ (1 + (1 − ρ))H˜, we
32
have
‖H(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 · ‖∆1‖H˜−1 ≤‖xt − x?‖ ·
∥∥∥HH˜−1H∥∥∥1/2 · ‖∆1‖ · ∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥
≤‖xt − x?‖ ·
√
2
∥∥∥H1/2∥∥∥ · γ
2
‖xt − x?‖2 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥
≤
√
2γL1/2
2
‖xt − x?‖3 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥ .
We also have
‖∆1‖H˜−1 · ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 ≤‖∆1‖ ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥ · γ ‖xt − x?‖ · ‖xt − x?‖ ∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥
≤γ
2
2
‖xt − x?‖4 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥ .
where the first inequality is because the condition that ‖Ht −H?‖ ≤ γ ‖xt − x?‖. Finally, we have
‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖H˜−1 · ‖H(xt − x?)‖H˜−1
≤γ ‖xt − x?‖2 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥ · ‖xt − x?‖ · ∥∥∥HH˜−1H∥∥∥1/2
≤
√
2γL1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥ .
Combining the conditions that ‖xt − x?‖ ≤ ργ · τζ
1/2
L1/2
and λmin(H˜) ≥ ζ, we have
∆2 ≤3
√
2γL1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥+ γ2 ‖xt − x?‖4 · ∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
≤5γL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3 + τ
L
· ργL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3
≤6γL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3 , (B.4)
where the last inequality is due to τ ≤ L and ρ ≤ 1. Thus, we get that
−‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 ≤− 2ρ(f(xt)− f(x?)) +
4γρ
3
‖xt − x?‖3 + 6γL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3
≤− 2ρ(f(xt)− f(x?)) + 22
3
γL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3 ,
(B.5)
where the last inequality follows from that ρ ≤ 1 and ζ ≤ L.
Now, we begin to bound the value of term ‖∇f(xt)‖3H˜−1 . First, we have
‖∇f(xt)‖3H˜−1 = ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 · ‖∇f(xt)‖H˜−1
≤‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 ·
∥∥∥H˜−1/2∥∥∥ ‖∇f(xt)‖
(2.2)
≤ Lζ−1/2 ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 · ‖xt − x?‖ .
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We can bound the value of ‖∇f(x)‖2
H˜−1 as follows:
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1
= ‖H(xt − x?) + ∆1 + (H? −H)(xt − x?)‖2H˜−1
≤‖H(xt − x?)‖2H˜−1 + ‖∆1‖2H˜−1 + ‖(H? −H)(xt − x?)‖2H˜−1 + ∆2
(3.1)
≤ ‖xt − x?‖2H + 2γ2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥ · ‖xt − x?‖4 + ∆2
= ‖xt − x?‖2H? + 〈xt − x?, (H −H?)(xt − x?)〉+ 2γ2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥ · ‖xt − x?‖4 + ∆2
(2.4)
≤ ‖xt − x?‖2H? + γ ‖xt − x?‖3 + 2γ2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥ · ‖xt − x?‖4 + ∆2
≤‖xt − x?‖2H? + 7γL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3 .
The last inequality is because of Eqn. (B.4), 1 ≤ L1/2ζ−1/2 and the condition ‖xt − x?‖ ≤ ργ · τζ
1/2
L1/2
.
We also have that
f(xt) ≥f(x?) + 〈∇f(x?), xt − x?〉+ 1
2
〈∇2f(x?)(xt − x?), xt − x?〉 − γ
6
‖xt − x?‖3
=f(x?) +
1
2
‖xt − x?‖2H? −
γ
6
‖xt − x?‖3 .
Therefore, we have
‖∇f(x)‖3
H˜−1 ≤Lζ−1/2 ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 · ‖xt − x?‖
≤Lζ−1/2 · ‖xt − x?‖
(
2(f(xt)− f(x?) + γ
3
‖xt − x?‖3 + 7γL1/2ζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖3
)
≤2Lζ−1/2 ‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?)) + 15γL3/2ζ−1 ‖xt − x?‖4 , (B.6)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that 1 ≤ L1/2ζ−1/2.
Therefore, we can obtain that
Eu[f(xt+1)− f(x?)]
≤f(xt)− f(x?)− b
64(d+ 2)
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
b3γ
64
d−3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1 + ∆µ
(B.5)
≤ f(xt)− f(x?)− bρ
32(d+ 2)
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + 2bγL
1/2ζ−1/2
3(d+ 2)
‖xt − x?‖3
+
b3γ
64
d−3/2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥3/2 · ‖∇f(x)‖3H˜−1 + ∆µ
(B.6)
≤
(
1− bρ
32(d+ 2)
)
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + 2bγL
1/2ζ−1/2
3(d+ 2)
‖xt − x?‖3
+
b3γLζ−2
64d3/2
‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?)) + b
3γ2L3/2ζ−5/2
4d3/2
‖xt − x?‖4 + ∆µ.
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Since the objective function is τ -strongly convex, by Lemma 10, we have
‖xt − x?‖3 ≤ 2
τ
· ‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?)) ,
and by the condition of ‖xt − x?‖ ≤ ργ · τζ
1/2
L1/2
, we also have
b3γ2L3/2ζ−5/2
4d3/2
‖xt − x?‖4 ≤b
3γ2L3/2ζ−5/2
4d3/2
· 2
τ
‖xt − x?‖2 · (f(xt)− f(x?))
≤b
3γLζ−2
2d3/2
‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?)) .
Thus, we have
Eu [f(xx+1)− f(x?)]
≤
(
1− bρ
32(d+ 2)
)
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + 4bγL
1/2ζ−1/2
3τ(d+ 2)
‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?))
+
(
b3γLζ−2
64d3/2
+
b3γLζ−2
2d3/2
)
‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ
=
(
1− bρ
32(d+ 2)
)
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + bγ ·∆3 · ‖xt − x?‖ · (f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ,
where ∆3 is defined as
∆3 =
4L1/2ζ−1/2
3τ(d+ 2)
+
33b2Lζ−2
64d3/2
.
To keep a fast convergence rate, we need
‖xt − x?‖ ≤ 1
2γ∆3
ρ
32(d+ 2)
≤ρ
γ
·min
(
3τζ1/2
256L1/2
,
d3/2ζ2
33L(d+ 2)b2
)
.
Thus, when xt satisfies the above condition, we can obtain that
Eu [f(xx+1)− f(x?)] ≤
(
1− bρ
64(d+ 2)
)
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Now, we give the global convergence property of Algorithm 1 in Theorem 2.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Taking a random step from xt, we have
Eu [f(xt+1)]
=Eu
[
f(xt − ηH˜−1gµ(xt))
]
(2.2)
≤ Eu
[
f(xt)− η
〈
∇f(xt), H˜−1Eu[gµ(xt)]
〉
+
η2L
2
Eu
∥∥∥H˜−1gµ(xt)∥∥∥2]
≤f(xt)− η ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 − η
〈
∇f(xt), H˜−1 (Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt))
〉
+
η2L
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
2
Eu ‖gµ(xt)‖2H˜−1
≤f(xt)− η ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
η
2
(
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 + ‖Eu[gµ(xt)]−∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1
)
(B.7)
+
η2L
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
2
Eu ‖gµ(xt)‖2H˜−1
≤f(xt)− η
2
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
ηµ2L2
8
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 3)3 + η2L
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
2
Eu ‖gµ(xt)‖2H˜−1 (B.8)
≤f(xt)− η
2
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 +
ηµ2L2
8
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 3)3
+
η2L
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥
2b
(
µ2
2
L2
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥ (d+ 6)3 + 2(d+ 2) ‖∇f(x)‖2H˜−1) (B.9)
=f(xt)− η
2
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 + η2L(d+ 2)b−1
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥ ‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1
+
ηµ2L2
8
∥∥∥H˜−1∥∥∥2 (d+ 3)3 + η2L3µ2
∥∥∥H˜−2∥∥∥
4b
(d+ 6)3
Inequality (B.7) is because of Cauchy’s inequality and 2ab ≤ a2 + b2. Inequality (B.8) follows from
Lemma 1. and inequality (B.9) is due to Lemma 2 with B = H˜−1.
Since ζI  H˜ holds for all iterations, let us set the step size η as
η =
bζ
4(d+ 2)L
.
Thus we obtain that
Eu [f(xt+1)] ≤ f(xt)− bζ
16(d+ 2)L
‖∇f(xt)‖2H˜−1 + ∆µ,
where ∆µ denotes that
∆µ =
bµ2L
32(d+ 2)ζ
(d+ 3)2 +
bµ2L
64ζ(d+ 2)2
(d+ 6)3 =
bµ2L
32ζ(d+ 2)
(
(d+ 3)3 +
(d+ 6)3
2(d+ 2)
)
.
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By Lemma 10, we have
Eu [f(xt+1)− f(x?)] ≤f(xt)− f(x?)− ζ
16(d+ 2)L2
‖∇f(xt)‖2 + ∆µ
≤f(xt)− f(x?)− ζτ
16(d+ 2)L2
(f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ
=
(
1− ζ
16(d+ 2)κL
)
· (f(xt)− f(x?)) + ∆µ
C Proof of Section 3.4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Our proof of Theorem 3 relies on the existing results about noisy power method depicted in
Algorithm 4. Because of the approximation, we can cast our zeroth-order power method as the
noisy power method and the product HµVt can be regarded as HµVt = ∇2f(x)Vt + Gt with Gt
being the noise matrix. Balcan et al. (2016) showed that the noisy power method converges to the
principal eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix and have the follow properties.
Lemma 11 (Balcan et al. (2016)). Given positive definite matrix H ∈ Rd×d and 0 <  < 1, suppose
that noise matrix satisfies
‖Gt‖ ≤ C12λk+1 and ‖V Tk Gt‖2 = C22λk+1 cos (Vk, Xt) .
Then, after T iterations, VT returned by Algorithm 4 satisfies∥∥H − VTV TT H∥∥ ≤ (1 + ) ‖H −Hk‖ , if T = C3 log
(
tan(Uk, V0)

)
.
where Hk = UkΛkU
>
k is the best rank-k approximation of H. C1, C2, and C3 are absolute constants.
Proof of Theorem 3. First, we us denote H = ∇2f(x). By the definition of VT and Vˆ in Algo-
rithm 2, we have∥∥∥H − V ΛV >∥∥∥ ≤∥∥∥H − VTV >T HVTV >T ∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥VTV >T HVTV >T − V ΛV >∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥H − VTV >T H∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥VTV >T H − VTV >T HVTV >T ∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥VTV >T HVTV >T − VT Vˆ ΛVˆ >V >T ∥∥∥
≤2
∥∥∥H − VTV >T H∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥VTV >T HVTV >T − VT Vˆ ΛVˆ >V >T ∥∥∥
≤3λk+1 +
∥∥∥VTV >T HVTV >T − VT Vˆ ΛVˆ >V >T ∥∥∥ ,
where the last inequality is because of Lemma 11 with  = 1/2.
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Furthermore, by the step 6 of Algorithm 2, we have∥∥∥VTV >T HVTV >T − VT Vˆ ΛVˆ >V >T ∥∥∥ =∥∥∥V >T HVT − Vˆ ΛVˆ >∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥V >T HVT − Vˆ U>HµVT∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥V >T − Vˆ U>∥∥∥ · ‖HVT −HµVT ‖
≤2 ‖HVT −HµVT ‖ ,
where the last inequality is because of
∥∥∥V >T − Vˆ U>∥∥∥ ≤ ‖VT ‖+ ∥∥∥Vˆ U>∥∥∥ ≤ 2.
Now, we begin to bound the value of ‖HVT −HµVT ‖. Let v be a unit vector, we have∥∥∥∥∇f(x+ µ1 · v)−∇f(x)µ1 −∇2f(x)v
∥∥∥∥ =∥∥∥∥∇f(x+ µ1 · v)−∇f(x)− µ1∇2f(x)vµ1
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥µ1 · v
(∇2f(x˜)−∇2f(x))
µ1
∥∥∥∥∥
≤µ1 · γ ‖v‖2 = γµ1,
where the last inequality is because of Eqn. (2.4) and x˜ = x+ θ · (µ1v) with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Let ∇˜f(x) denote the approximate gradient computed as follows:
∇˜jf(x) = f(x+ µ1 · ej)− f(x− µ1 · ej)
2µ1
.
We also use [] Then, we have∥∥∥∇f(x)− ∇˜f(x)∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥[∇˜1f(x)−∇1f(x), . . . , ∇˜df(x)−∇df(x)]>∥∥∥∥
=
1
2µ1
·
∥∥∥∥[ (f(x+ µ1 · e1)− f(x− µ1 · e1)− 2µ1∇jf(x)) , . . . ,
(f(x+ µ1 · ed)− f(x− µ1 · ed)− 2µ1∇df(x))
]>∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥µ21 · diag
(∇2f(x˜1)−∇2(x˜2))
4µ1
∥∥∥∥∥
(2.4)
≤ µ1
4
γ ‖x˜1 − x˜2‖
≤γµ
2
1
2
,
where the last inequality is because of x˜1 = x+ θ1 · (µ1v) with 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1 and x˜2 = x− θ2 · (µ1v)
with 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1.
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Combining the above results, we have
‖HVT −HµVT ‖ = ‖H[v1, v2, . . . , vk]−Hµ[v1, v2, . . . , vk]‖
≤k ‖Hv1 −Hµv1‖
=k
∥∥∥∥∥∇˜f(x+ µ1 · v)− ∇˜f(x)µ1 −∇2f(x)v
∥∥∥∥∥
≤k
∥∥∥∥∇f(x+ µ1 · v)−∇f(x)µ1 −∇2f(x)v
∥∥∥∥
+ k
∥∥∥∥∥∇˜f(x+ µ1 · v)−∇f(x+ µ1 · v) +∇f(x)− ∇˜f(x)µ1
∥∥∥∥∥
≤k
(
µ1γ ‖v1‖2 + 2γµ
2
1
2µ1
)
≤2kµ1γ.
Therefore, we have ∥∥∥H − V ΛV >∥∥∥ ≤ 3λk+1 + 2 ‖HVT −HµVT ‖ ≤ 5λk+1
where the last inequality is because that we set µ and µ1 as follows
kγµ1 + 2
√
dL
µ
µ1
≤ 2λk+1
Furthermore, we can obtain that∥∥∥H − V V >HµV V >∥∥∥ ≤ 5λk+1
⇒− 5λk+1 ‖y‖2 ≤ y>
(
H − V V >HµV V >
)
y ≤ 5λk+1 ‖y‖2
⇒− 10λk+1 ‖y‖2 ≤ y>
(
H − H˜
)
y ≤ 0
⇒y>H˜y − 6λk+1 ‖y‖2
(a)
≤ y>Hy
(b)
≤ y>H˜y
Let us consider the
(a)
≤ case and have
y>H˜y − 10λk+1 ‖y‖2 ≤ y>Hy
⇒y>H˜y ≤ y>Hy + 10λk+1 ‖y‖2 ≤
(
1 +
10λk+1
λmin
)
y ≤ y>Hy
⇒
(
1− 10λk+1
λmin + 10λk+1
)
H˜  H
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Algorithm 4 Noisy Power Method.
1: Input: A positive definite matrix H ∈ Rd×d, orthonormal matrix X ∈ Rd×p, target rank k;
2: for t = 0, . . . until termination do
3: Yt = HXt +Gt for some noise matrix Gt;
4: QR factorization: Yt = Xt+1Rt+1, where Vt+1 consists of orthonormal columns.
5: end for
Therefore, we have (
1− 10λk+1
λmin + 10λk+1
)
H˜  H  H˜.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 3, it takes O (dk · log(tan(Uk, V0))) queries to construct the ap-
proximate Hessian. We also need O(d) queries to estimate gradient. By Theorem 1 and 3, we need
O
(
dλk+1
bτ log
(
1

))
iterations to achieve an -accuracy. Hence, we have
Q() =O
(
dλk+1
bτ
b log
(
1

)
+
dλk+1
bτ
· dk · tan(Uk, V0) log
(
1

))
=O
(
dkλk+1
τ
· log(tan(Uk, V0)) · log
(
1

))
,
=O˜
(
dkλk+1
τ
· log
(
1

))
.
D Proof of Section 4
D.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4. By the definition of fµ(x), we have∥∥∇2fµ(x)−∇2f(x)∥∥ =∥∥∇2E [f(x+ µu)]−∇2f(x)∥∥
=
∥∥E [∇2f(x+ µu)]−∇2f(x)∥∥
≤E [∥∥∇2f(x+ µu)−∇2f(x)∥∥]
≤γµE ‖u‖
≤γµ(d+ 1)1/2.
The first inequality is due to Jensen’s inequality. The second inequality is by Eqn. (2.4). And the
last inequality follows from Lemma 8.
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D.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 5. To get a convenient expression, we rewrite Eqn. (2.6) in another form by intro-
ducing a new integration variable y = x+ µu:
fµ(x) =
1
µdM
∫
Rd
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
dy.
Then, its gradient can be written as,
∇fµ(x) = 1
µd+2M
∫
E
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
(y − x) dy.
Then, we have
∇2fµ(x) =− 1
µd+2M
∫
E
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
dy
+
1
µd+4M
∫
E
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
· (y − x)(y − x)> dy
=−
[
1
µ2M
∫
E
f(x+ µu) exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du
]
Id +
1
µ2M
∫
E
f(x+ µu)uu> exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du
=
1
µ2M
∫
E
[f(x+ µu)− f(x)]uu> exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du+
1
µ2
(f(x)− fµ(x))Id. (D.1)
Furthermore, fµ(x) can also be defined as
fµ(x) =
1
M
∫
Rd
f(x− µu) exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du.
Similarly, by introducing y = x− µu, we have
fµ(x) = − 1
µdM
∫
Rd
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
dy.
And its gradient is,
∇fµ(x) = − 1
µd+2M
∫
E
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
(y − x) dy.
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Then, we have
∇2fµ(x) = 1
µd+2M
∫
E
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
dy
− 1
µd+4M
∫
E
f(y) exp
(
− 1
2µ2
‖y − x‖2
)
· (y − x)(y − x)> dy
=−
[
1
µ2M
∫
E
f(x− µu) exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du
]
I +
1
µ2M
∫
E
f(x− µu)uu> exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du
=
1
µ2M
∫
E
[f(x− µu)− f(x)]uu> exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du+
1
µ2
(f(x)− fµ(x))Id. (D.2)
Combining the Eqn. (D.1) and (D.2), we have
∇2fµ(x) =1
2
(∇2fµ(x) +∇2fµ(x))
=
1
M
∫
Rd
f(x+ µu) + f(x− µu)− 2f(x)
2µ2
uu> exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du+
f(x)− fµ(x)
µ2
· Id.
Therefore, we have
Eu[H˜] = ∇2fµ(x) +
(
λ− f(x)− fµ(x)
µ2
)
· Id.
The inequality ∇2fµ(x)  Eu[H˜] is because of fµ(x) ≥ f(x) which is implied by
fµ(x) = E[f(x+ µu)] ≥ E [f(x) + µ 〈∇f(x), u〉] = f(x)
where the inequality is because of convexity of f(x).
E Parameter Setting
F Visualization of Adversarial Attack
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Table 3: Parameter settings in MNIST experiments
Algorithm b µ lr ν
targeted
ZOO 100 0.01 0.5 -
PGD-NES 100 0.05 0.02 -
ZOHA-Gauss 100 0.01 0.04 -
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 50-200 0.01 0.04 -
ZOHA-Diag 100 0.1 0.04 0.85
ZOHA-Diag-DC 50-200 0.1 0.04 0.85
un-targeted
ZOO 100 0.01 0.5 -
PGD-NES 100 0.05 0.02 -
ZOHA-Gauss 100 0.01 0.04 -
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 50-200 0.01 0.04 -
ZOHA-Diag 100 0.1 0.04 0.8
ZOHA-Diag-DC 50-200 0.1 0.04 0.8
Table 4: Parameter settings in ImageNet experiments
Algorithm b µ lr ν
targeted
ZOO 50 0.01 2 -
PGD-NES 50 0.01 0.01 -
ZOHA-Gauss 50 0.05 0.03 -
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 50-200 0.05 0.03 -
ZOHA-Diag 50 0.03 0.015 0.8
ZOHA-Diag-DC 50-200 0.03 0.015 0.8
un-targeted
ZOO 50 0.01 0.5 -
PGD-NES 50 0.01 0.01 -
ZOHA-Gauss 50 0.02 0.02 -
ZOHA-Gauss-DC 50-200 0.02 0.02 -
ZOHA-Diag 50 0.03 0.03 0.7
ZOHA-Diag-DC 50-200 0.03 0.03 0.7
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Figure 5: Adversarial examples on MNIST. The label is denoted on the left side.
44
Figure 6: Targeted adversarial examples on ResNet50 and ImageNet. The label is denoted on the
left side.
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Figure 7: Un-targeted adversarial examples on ResNet50 and ImageNet. The label is denoted on
the left side.
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